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In Switzerland, radioactive waste arises from elec-
tricity produced by five nuclear power plants and from the
use of radioactive materials in the fields of medicine,
industry and research. The waste is grouped into three
categories: High-level waste (HLW) including spent fuel,
Long-lived intermediate-level waste (LILW), and Low-
and intermediate-level waste (L/ILW). It is foreseen that a
maximum of 100,000 m3 of conditioned and packaged
radioactive waste will arise in Switzerland over a period
of 40 years. Based on current knowledge, geological
disposal is the only method for isolating radioactive
waste, which fulfils the requirement for long-term safety.
Two different types of geologic repositories are foreseen
in Switzerland: a deep repository at a depth between 400
and 1,000 m in the flat alpine foreland for HLW/LILW
(accessed through vertical shafts or a ramp), and an in-
termediate-depth repository in the alpine belt for L/ILW
(accessed through a horizontal tunnel). Recently it has
been proposed that these repositories shall be built as
monitored geological disposal facilities, where the back-
filling of access tunnels is delayed for several decades.
The behaviour of the safety barriers shall be monitored
through long-term experiments in a so-called pilot facil-
ity, which is situated just beside the sealed main disposal
area.
The federal government and its experts have estab-
lished legal and political procedures and protection ob-
jectives for these repositories. The Swiss Federal Nuclear
Safety Inspectorate HSK has published the official re-
quirements for geological disposal in the year 1993 (R 21
guideline). The provisions in this guideline apply to all
methods of geological disposal in Switzerland and to all
categories of radioactive waste intended for disposal.
They relate exclusively to long-term safety following
closure of a repository. The overall objective of geolog-
ical disposal is to protect human health and the environ-
ment permanently against radiation from the wastes. The
two most important Swiss protection objectives are as
follows:
Protection objective 1
The release of radionuclides from a sealed repository,
subject to the processes and events that may reasonably
be expected to occur during its lifetime, shall at no time
give rise to individual doses that exceed 0.1 mSv/year.
Protection objective 2
The individual radiological risk of a fatality arising from a
sealed repository, subsequent to processes and events not
considered under protection objective 1, shall at no time
exceed one in a million/year.
These objectives recognize humans as being radiation-
sensitive organisms and thus, released radiation into the
population must not exceed a fraction of the dose nor-
mally received from natural background radiation. If the
human population is rigorously protected from radiation
exposure, it is assumed that other living organisms will
likewise be protected. These objectives are integral to the
protection of our natural environment and are not limited
to any specific time limits. In the licensing procedure,
the applicant (the Swiss nuclear waste producers) must
demonstrate by means of a safety analysis that its pro-
posal fulfils these requirements. Because of the integral
nature of these objectives, the corresponding safety
analyses must be based on model calculations incorpo-
rating the full complexity inherent in these systems.
Two strongly different aspects of these protection ob-
jectives will be briefly discussed. The first relates to the
mismatch between the know-how of scientists involved in
assessing these objectives for a given nuclear waste site
and the knowledge of the local population living near the
site. The second aspect deals with the challenges these
objectives pose to the specialists and safety authorities
involved.
In Switzerland (as elsewhere), the site investigation
and safety assessment technologies developed during the
last 20 years have reached a very high scientific and
technical level (greatly exceeding that used to evaluate
municipal and chemical waste disposal sites). Even for
most professional engineers and geologist, who are not
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necessarily trained in the nuclear waste disposal field, it is
very difficult to evaluate the results from the corre-
sponding safety analyses. This has lead to the call for
more specific, and if possible, directly measurable site
evaluation criteria.
During the many years of democratic political argu-
ments about potential sites for L/ILW and HLW in
Switzerland, such site evaluation criteria have been
agreed upon formally (although they have not been
written into nuclear waste disposal regulations). They
depend on the stage/progress of investigation at a given
site and the type of waste/repository called for. In the
Swiss HLM/LILW repository program, a potential host
rock (Opalinus Clay) and disposal region (Zrcher
Weinland) has recently been identified after 20 years of
site evaluation and field investigation work. Key criteria
evaluated during the site selection process include the
isolation capacity of the host rock, seismic and geody-
namic stability, fault pattern, depth and volume of host
rock, groundwater flow properties, and explorability. In
the L/ILW program, several investigations at various lo-
cations led to the proposition in 1993 of a potential host
rock (Valanginian Marl) at a pre-alpine site (Wellenberg).
This site was subsequently studied in great detail during
the following years until the construction of an explora-
tion drift was required to allow further geological/hy-
drogeological investigation. Site exclusion criteria were
agreed upon prior to the construction of this drift, in-
cluding the spatial distribution of low conductivity host
rock, the rate of groundwater inflow into the drift, and the
groundwater chemistry.
Even with such measurable and clearly defined crite-
ria, a few scientific reviewers did not agree to the con-
clusions drawn by the specialists of the applicant and
regulator involved in the site characterisation and selec-
tion process. Political, social and/or personal motivations
significantly influenced scientific statements made by
earth scientists, giving politicians the required arguments
used in public debates. This was only one of many rea-
sons that in 2002, the application for a concession for an
exploratory drift of the Wellenberg site was rejected by
the people of the State of Nidwalden (57% against 43%),
causing a major stop in the L/ILW program. Although the
Federal Council had already granted the licence for this
drift and the Cantonal Government had already granted
the necessary concessions, the ensuing political develop-
ments require that today we must re-evaluate the entire
L/ILW disposal concept, discussing and defining new
legal constraints on a national level. A new Nuclear En-
ergy Law that clarifies the roles of various stakeholders
has recently passed the Swiss Parliament and was pub-
lished for public discussion.
Turning to the challenges that the Swiss protection
objectives pose to nuclear waste disposal professionals,
the assessment of the specific site criteria discussed above
is a relatively easy task compared to the evaluation of the
two protection objectives described above. For example,
it is already known that for a HLW/LILW repository in a
highly overconsolidated claystone at 600–800 m depth
(Opalinus Clay), complex coupled thermo-hydro-me-
chanical (and geochemical) processes exist influencing
the behaviour of the host rock. Fractures in the excava-
tion-disturbed zone (EDZ) develop in response to the
excavation of shafts, drifts and caverns. These fractures
conduct fluids and gases and change their properties in
response to swelling bentonite backfill, the heat pulse
generated from waste, geochemical reactions, and fluid
and gas pressures derived from the geosphere and/or
waste. Aspects of these processes are the subjects of
current studies in underground test facilities such as Mont
Terri and in other ordinary laboratories involving so-
phisticated experiments, but are limited with respect to
the selected coupled process components and are rarely at
the scale of the disposal project.
As an engineering geologist who is also involved in
several big tunnelling projects, this writer had to learn in
the past that nature (the rock mass) sometimes looks very
different from what is expected and reacts in new and
unexpected modes. Sometimes, such surprises were en-
countered in areas where it was thought that the geology
would be simple and well known. In tunnelling, the time
scales between exploration, prediction, design and con-
struction are in the order of 10 years; the operational
phase lasts approximately 100 years. For nuclear waste
repositories the time scales involved are obviously com-
pletely different and in the case of the Swiss protection
objectives, there are no time limits. Robust (simple)
scenario analyses and monitored geological disposal fa-
cilities help to reduce some of the corresponding uncer-
tainties but they will not allow detailed prediction of what
will happen in a couple hundred thousand years. There-
fore the limits of current knowledge and the uncertainty
of predictions both in space, time and conceptual under-
standing should be carefully discussed.
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